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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent,

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

:

Case Nos . 20694 and 20710

v.
GEORGE RAY NEELEY and
LYNN L. BELT,
Defendants/Appellants.

:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is

an

appeal

from

convictions

and

judgments

against George Ray Neeley and Lynn L. Belt for one count each
of Criminal Trespass, an infraction, in violation of Utah Code
Annotated, §76-6-206

(1953

Burglary, a third degree

as

amended);

felony,

one

count

in violation

of

each
Utah

of

Code

Annotated, §76-6-202 (1953 as amended); and one count each of
Theft, a

second

degree

Annotated, §76-6-404

felony,

(1953

as

in

violation

amended).

A

of

jury

Utah

Code

found

them

guilty following a trial which occurred on April 4th, 5th, 9th
and 10th, 1985, in the Third Judicial District Court, in and
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Jay E. Banks,
Judge, presiding.

On May 13th, 1985, Mr. Belt and Mr. Neeley

were each sentenced by the same court to a term of incarceration
of three months

for the

criminal

trespass

(sic), a term

of

incarceration from zero to five years for the burglary, and a
term of incarceration from one to fifteen years for the theft,
all terms to run concurrently.

(R. 281-285)

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Should

the

trial

judge

have

recused

himself

because he had prosecuted one of the appellants prior to his
becoming a judge?
II.

Should the case have been remanded back to the

circuit court because a recording malfunction prevented transcription of the preliminary hearing?
III.

Did the trial court err

by refusing to instruct

the jury on the lesser included offense of criminal trespass?
IV.

Did the trial court err

by refusing to give a

cautionary instruction regarding accomplice testimony?
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 11, 1983, the Appellants, George Ray Neeleyand Lynn L. Belt, were arrested leaving Spectra Symbol Corporation at 2534 Directors Row in Salt Lake City, Utah.

(R. 383)

A third person, David Bittner, was also apprehended at the same
time but was not charged with any crime.

(R. 383)

Mr. Neeley

and Mr. Belt were each charged with one count of burglary and
one count of theft arising from this April incident.

(R. 29)

In addition, each was charged with two other counts of burglary
supposedly occurring
20th, 1983.

at the same business on March

(R. 29-30)

19th and

At the preliminary hearing, the March

19th charge was dismissed, the March 20th burglary charge was
reduced to

a

class

C

misdemeanor

(criminal

trespass),

and

Appellants were bound over to stand trial on that misdemeanor

and the April 11th felony charges.

(R. 6, 29-30)

Defense counsel filed a pre-trial motion
that the trial judge, Jay E. Banks, recuse himself.

requesting
This motion

was based on the fact that the trial judge had previously been
the prosecuting attorney in four different cases against Appellant Lynn Belt between 1964 and 1970.

(R. 87-88)

Judge Banks

referred the motion to Judge Dean Conder, of the Third Judicial
District Court, to determine

it sufficiency.

Conder denied the motion without hearing.
this matter was delayed

(R. 88) Judge

(R. 85)

for several months.

Trial on

Defense counsel

renewed the motion to recuse a few days before trial by filing
an Amended Affidavit.

(R. 141-143, 134-140)

Judge Banks found

this affidavit to contain insufficient bases
referred the matter

to Judge

Judicial District Court.

Phillip

(R. 143)

for recusal but

Fishier, of the Third

Judge Fishier conducted a

hearing on the recusal motion at the close of which he indicated,
"My thinking

would be

if I could

check around

the district

court and see if we could find a judge who could just trade
calendars with Judge Banks".
Judge Fishier later denied

(R. 901)

Despite this statement,

the motion by minute entry.

(R.

133)
Defense counsel

also

filed

a

pre-trial

motion

to

remand the case to the circuit court for another preliminary
hearing.

This motion was filed because a malfunction in the

recording equipment

during

the preliminary

hearing

prevented

appellants from receiving a complete copy of the transcript of
that proceeding.

(R. 89-90)

This motion was denied by Judge

Banks.

(R. 146)
At trial, the primary witness against appellants was

David Bittner.
344)

Bittner was an employee of Spectra Symbol.

(R.

He testified that he accompanied Mr. Neeley and Mr. Belt

to Spectra Symbol late at night on March 19th, 1983, at which
time all three entered the building and a small amount of silver
used by the business was taken.

(R. 348-358)

Bittner further

testified that the three returned to Spectra Symbol late on the
evening of April 11th, 1983.

Bittner stated that the object of

this visit was to take a large quantity of silver.

(R. 384-85)

Bittner, who had been granted immunity by the County Attorney's
Office, testified

that

this

plan was

foiled

because he had

reported the earlier entrance into the business to his employer
and to

the

revealed:

police.

(R.

361-62)

Bittner1s

testimony

that he had previously been convicted

also

of felonies

and was on parole at the time of these incidents (R. 343-344);
that he was

using drugs

at the time

of these

incidents

in

violation of his parole agreement (R. 450); that he had been
paid by the police

for his

involvement

363, 406-410);

that

had

and

he

in this

perjured

incident (R.

himself during

the

preliminary hearing in the matter (R. 384, 398, 405-406).
Both appellants

testified

in

their testimony directly contradicted
appellants testified

that

once, on April 11th, 1983.

they

were

their

own

behalf

that of Bittner.
at

(R. 729, 785)

Spectra

Symbol

and
Both
only

They further testified

that they went to the business that night at Bittner1s request
to help him retrieve and dispose of some marijuana in his locker

at the business, because he was expecting his parole agent to
search the

locker.

(R.

721, 730-731/

736f

796)

Finally,

appellants testified that Bittner told them that he had authority
to be in the business at any timef day or night.

(R. 726, 731,

779, 780)
Because of Bittner1s involvement in the alleged
crimes/ defense counsel requested that an accomplice instruction
be given to the jury.

(R. 185)

This instruction would have

cautioned the jury concerning the perils of the testimony of an
accomplice.
879)

The requested

instruction was denied.

Finally/ defense counsel also requested

(R. 185,

instructions on

the lesser included offense of criminal trespass with respect
to the April 11th incident.

(R. 169-172/ 194f 227f

880-882)

Those instructions were also denied.
Appellants were convicted of one count each of criminal
trespass, an

infraction/

burglary,

and

theft.

From

those

convictions, this appeal is taken.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The first argument presented

on appeal

is that the

trial judge should have been recused from this case because he
had previously

prosecuted

one

of

judge should not preside at trial.
should be avoided.

the appellants.

A biased

Even the appearance of bias

In order to avoid the appearance of bias,

the trial judge should have been recused/ either on his own
initiative or by another district court Judge.

Appellants next
been remanded

to

the

contend

circuit

that

court

the

for

case

another

hearing since an equipment malfunction prevented
the original preliminary hearing.

should

have

preliminary
recording of

Courts have generally held

that reversible error is committed when a defendant is denied a
preliminary hearing transcript if the denial results in prejudice
to the defendant.

In this case, the denial was prejudicial

because appellants

did

hearing testimony

of

not

have

accomplice

access
David

to

the

preliminary

Bittner, who

admitted

that he perjured himself at that hearing.
In the third issue presented, appellants claim that
the trial

court

committed

error

in refusing

to give a jury

instruction on the lesser included offense of criminal trespass.
Some of

the evidence adduced

been relied

on

by

the

at trial could

jury

to

acquit

reasonably

appellants

greater charge and convict them of the lesser charge.

of

have
the

However,

since no instruction concerning a lesser charge was given, the
jury was not given this option.
Finally, appellants submit that the trial court
should have given a requested instruction concerning accomplice
testimony.

Such an instruction is required

testimony is self-contradictory.

if the accomplice

In this case, the accomplice

admitted at trial that he had perjured himself at the preliminary
hearinq.

This

obvious

self-contradiction

in

the

testimony

mandated the need for a cautionary instruction reqardinq accomplice testimony.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT JUDGE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY FAILING TO RECUSE HIMSELF AT
TRIAL.
The courts have generally ruled that a biased judge
should not

sit at trial.

This rule

Supreme Court of Colorado:

was well-stated

by the

"Courts must meticulously avoid any

appearance of partiality...to retain public respect and secure
willing and

ready obedience

to their judgments."

District Court, 192 Colo. 503, 560 P.2d

People v.

826 (1977), quoting

Nordloh v. Packard, 45 Colo. 515, 101 P.787 (1909).
Consistent with this rule was the then-existing Article
VIII, Section 13 of the Utah Constitution which provided for
the disqualification

of the trial judge when the judge "may

have been of counsel" at an earlier date.
The same

protection

recognized in Utah's

Code

of

against

(See Addendum A)
biased

judges

Criminal Procedure.

Annotated, §77-35-29(c), Rule 29 (1982).

is also

Utah Code

(See Addendum B)

The

bias may be either against a party or in favor of either party.
The rule

requires

the

judge

to proceed

no

further

affidavit alleging bias or prejudice is filed.

once

an

Another judge

must either try the case or conduct a recusal hearing.

In the

instant case, in a pretrial motion, defense counsel requested
that the trial judge recuse himself from presiding

over this

case due to prior contact he had with appellant Belt.

While

the judge served as District Attorney for Salt Lake County, the
County Attorney's Office prosecuted the following cases against

Lynn Belt:
State of Utah v. Lynn Belt and Gaylen
Jonas, Case No. 18935; Burglary and Theft;
Arraignment July 21, 1964; Information was
signed by Jay E. Banks.
State of Utah v. Lynn Belt, Case No. 19931;
Burglary and Theft; Trial November 28, 1966
to November 30, 1966; Information signed by
Jay E. Banks.
State of Utah v. Lynn Belt, Case No. 22074;
Burglary and Theft; Arraignment February 2,
1970; Information signed by Jay E. Banks.
State of Utah v. Lynn Belt, Case No. 22535;
Burglary and Theft; Arraignment June 15,
1970; Information signed by Jay E. Banks.
(R. 134-138, 141-143, 144-145) (See Addendum C)
On September 8, 1964, in Case No. 18935, in State of
Utah v. Lynn Belt and Gaylen Jonas, Judge Banks personally appeared as the attorney

for the State of Utah, at which time

appellant Belt

a

Burglary.

entered

plea

of

guilty

to

Second

Degree

Belt was sentenced on September 21, 1964 to the Utah

State Prison.

This judgment and conviction was later set aside

and reversed on a Writ of Habeaus Corpus filed in the United
States District Court.
the judge

had

In trying the case of a defendant which

previously

prosecuted,

appellants

their due process rights were violated

by

submit

the trial

that

judge's

refusal to recuse himself.
The original trial date in the instant case was set
for the 8th day of January, 1985.
prior contact with

the trial

(R. 84)

Because of the

judge, appellant Belt filed

affidavit to recuse the judge on December 12, 1984.
(Addendum D)

an

(R. 87-88)

The trial judge denied the motion and certified

it to another district court judge to determine its sufficiency
on December 14, 1984.
before trial, Judge

(R. 88)
Dean

On December 20, 1984, 18 days

Conder

reviewed

the

affidavit

and

denied the petition without hearing, concluding that there had
not been enough evidence introduced to show bias and prejudice.
(R. 85)
1985.

The January trial was then postponed until April 2,
(R. 129)

The original recusal motion was renewed before

the April trial date and heard before Judge Phillip Fishier,
who also denied the motion based on lack of timeliness and the
prior decision of Judge Conder.

(R. 133)

(Addendum E)

Addressing the timeliness issue raised by Judge
Fishier, Utah Code Annotated, §77-35-29

(1982) states that a

recusal motion must

as practicable."

be

other words, no specific

filed

"as

soon

time limit

is imposed.

In

Since this

motion was first raised well before the original trial date,
there should be no issue concerning lack of timeliness.
if Judge

Fishier

ruled

the

second

motion

was

not

Even

timely,

certainly the original was timely, being filed 18 days before
trial.
This Court

has

had

opportunity

recently

when disgualification of a judge should occur.

to define

In Anderson v.

Industrial Commission of Utah, 696 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1985),
this Court stated that, "[0]ne of the fundamental principles of
due process is that all parties to a case are entitled to an
unbiased, impartial

judge."

In addition,

this

Court

added,

"[F]airness requires not only an absence of actual bias, but
endeavors to prevent even the possibility of unfairness."

Id.

at 1221.

(Emphasis added).
In Anderson, the plaintiff had injured her knee while

working.

This injury required surgery and she applied to the

Industrial Commission for worker's compensation benefits.
After an unsuccessful operation, the plaintiff applied to the
Industrial Commission
disability.

The

for

original

additional

compensation

Administrative

Law

for

Judge

total

ordered

compensation for only thirteen weeks for temporary total disability.

The plaintiff objected to this finding, claiming it

was erroneous and the judge granted a further hearing.

Before

the hearing was held, the judge retired and was succeeded by
Mr. Timothy Allen, who had been counsel for the insurance fund
when the case was originally argued.
Allen issued

an

order

plaintiff's objection.

reaffirming

After the hearing, Judge
the

previous

order

over

On appeal, this Court held that Judge

Allen's failure to recuse himself constituted reversible error,
stating:
[W]hen a judge has previously been involved
in a case as an attorney, there is no need
to show actual prejudice. The law presumes
prejudice in such circumstances. Judge
Allen should have disqualified himself in
this case." Id. at 1221
In this case, as in Anderson, "fairness requires not
only an absence of actual bias, but endeavors to prevent even
the possibility

of

unfairness."

In both

cases, each

judge

acted improperly by trying a case after having acted as opposing
counsel in litigation involvinq the parties before them.
Because the

judge

in the instant

case personally

prosecuted

appellant Belt, he

should

have

disgualified

himself

as

the

trial judge.
In U.S. v. Zerilli, 328 F. Supp. 706, 708 ( C D . Calf.
1971), the judge was reguired to disgualify himself even though
it had been 30 years since he had prosecuted the defendant in a
criminal case.

The court stated the reason for reguiring him

to be disgualified, was to avoid "the appearance of possible
personal bias or prejudice."

This case demonstrates that the

passage of time does not cure a judge's possible bias or the
appearance thereof.

Therefore, even in cases such as in the

instant case, where the original action occurred long ago, the
trial judge should still disqualify himself.
Because of a trial

judge's prior

involvement

in an

investigation of the defendant's hotel (though totally unrelated
to the

assault

charge

being

tried),

Court in State v. Madry, 8 Wash.

the

Washington

2061, 504 P.2d

Supreme

1150, 1161

(1972) ruled that a judge must not only be impartial, but must
also have the appearance of impartiality.

The reason is that

" [T]he appearance of bias or prejudice can be as damaging to
public confidence in the administration of justice as would be
the actual presence of bias or prejudice."

(^d.* at 1161)

The Colorado Court of Appeals has followed the wellreasoned rule that a judge should be disgualified for even the
appearance of a lack of impartiality.

In Wood Bro. Homes Inc.

v. City of Fort Collins, 670

(Colo.

P.2d

9

App.

1983),

the

trial judge, prior to his appointment to the bench, had sat on
the Planning and Zoning Commission which considered and reviewed

the plot of land that formed the basis for the dispute.

The

motion to disqualify was denied by the judge on the basis that
he had no recollection of plaintiff's matter before the Commission.
The Court of Appeals stated, "While we find no evidence
of partiality, we conclude that because of the trial judge's
prior association

with

the

Commission, one might

reasonably

question his impartiality so as to render it improper for him
to have presided

over the trial

The court

that

ruled

the

in this case."

judge's

position

on

(I<i.
the

at 10)
Planning

Commission disqualified him from the case, even if the judge had
said that he had no recollection of the prior matter.

The court

continued by saying, "Even if the judge's impartiality

could

not be reasonably questioned, we still have a situation which
created the

appearance

of

impropriety,

judge from sitting on this case."

which

(Ld. at 10)

precludes

the

Similarly, in

the instant case, even if the trial judge's impartiality cannot
reasonably be questioned, the situation creates the appearance
of impropriety.
The position taken by these courts is directly
analogous to the Code of Judicial Conduct Cannon (3) (c) (1),
which provides in part that " [A] judge should disqualify himself
in a proceeding
questioned..."
viewpoint:

in which his partiality might

reasonably be

The commentary to this section reiterates this

"A judge formerly employed by a government agency

...should disqualify himself in a proceeding if his impartiality
might reasonably be Questioned

because of such association."

This position reaffirms the notion that even the appearance of
unfairness is grounds for recusal.
The law, as it has been set forth by this Court in
Anderson, which is a position that is supported by the ABA and
other case law in neighboring jurisdictions, mandates that the
trial judge should have recused himself from the trial in the
instant case.

Even absent a showing of actual prejudice, and

despite the lapse of time, his recusal was necessary to avoid
the possibilty of judicial partiality.

(Emphasis added) Accord-

ingly, appellant's convictions sould be reversed and remanded
for a new trial before a different judge.
POINT II
APPELLANTS WERE PREJUDICIALLY HARMED BECAUSE
THEY DID NOT RECEIVE A COMPLETE COPY OF THE
PRELIMINARY HEARING TRANSCRIPT.
Appellants' preliminary hearing in the Fifth Circuit
Court took place on May 18, 1983.

Through some malfunctions in

the recording equipment, they were prevented from receiving a
complete copy of the preliminary hearing transcript.

Counsel

for the appellants filed a motion to remand the matter for a
new preliminary hearing.

(R. 89, 90)

The motion was denied by

the trial court without hearing and the case was set for trial.
(R. 146)
ible error
hearing.

Appellants now claim that the court committed reversin not remanding this case for a new preliminary
The failure to provide a complete transcript violated

their rights, therefore this case should be reversed and remanded .

Under Utah law the circuit courts are now courts of
record and are required by statute to record the testimony at a
preliminary hearing and transmit the same to the district court
if a bind over is ordered.
Utah Code Annotated, §78-4-12 in part states:
A verbatim record of the proceedings before
circuit courts shall be maintained by a
certified shorthand reporter, suitable
electronic recording devices, or other means
approved by the judicial council, except
when the judge dispenses with such a record
in a particular case or a portion of the
proceedings with respect to it.
Utah Code Annotated, §77-35-7(d )(3) states:
If the magistrate orders the defendant
bound over to the district court, the
magistrate shall execute in writing a bindover order and shall forthwith transmit to
the clerk of the district court all pleadings
and records made of the proceedings before
the magistrate, including exhibits, recordings and the type-written transcript, if
made, in the magistrate's court.
Many courts have ruled that

it is error to deny a

defendant a complete preliminary hearing transcript.
these courts have ruled
See:

that this error

Some of

is not prejudicial.

State v. Scott, 11 Ariz. 68, 461 P.2d 712 (1969), People

v. Camel, 59

111.2d

422,

322

N.E.2d

36,

(1974).

However,

appellants submit that the better rule has been stated

in a

number of jurisdictions that have found reversible error where
a defendant

has

been

denied

a

complete

transcript

of

his

preliminary hearing.
The Oklahoma Court of Appeals recognized a defendant's
right to have a transcript of his preliminary hearing in Wright

v. State, 505 P.2d

507, 511

(Okla. 1973).

There, the court

stated:
Where due diligence is shown in an effort
to acquire [the preliminary hearing
transcript] and a showing to its need is
made, it is prejudicial error to force a
defendant to trial without a preliminary
hearing transcript.
In State v. Duffy,

35

Wis.2d

369,

151

N.W.2d

63,

(1967) the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated:
In all felony prosecutions before a magistrate the reporter should be called in to
report what transpires at each appearance
of the accused or his counsel.
In Gardner v. U.S. , 407 F.2d 1266, 1267, cert, denied,
395 U.S. 911 (D.C. cir. 1969) the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia was faced with facts similar to
those in

the

hearing was

present

case.

In

held

without

a

claimed prejudice

because

they

that

court

case, the

reporter.

were

unable

The
to

preliminary
appellants
impeach

any

witnesses with inconsistent statements they might have made at
the preliminary hearing.

On appeal the circuit court stated:

Appellant had a right to a written transcript
[of the preliminary hearing] upon request...
denial of this right requires reversal of
conviction if an accused was prejudiced.
In Brooks v. Edwards, 396 F.Supp. 662, 665 (W.D.N.C.
1974), the U.S. District Court of North Carolina, noting the
importance of a preliminary hearing transcript, stated:
It may well be that a transcript of a
preliminary hearing is more important than
a transcript of the trial itself; until
convicted an accused is theoretically
presumed innocent, and even small disadvantages can be critical, whereas after the
trial that presumption has been dispelled

and the use of a trial transcript may be of
far less value to the accused.
In the instant case, appellants were not provided a
complete transcript of the preliminary
noted above,

some

transcript result
lack of

the

appellants.

courts

require

in prejudice

transcript

did

that

hearing.
the

lack

However, as
of

to the defendant.

result

in

such

Here, the

prejudicial

harm

to

The accomplice, David Bittner, admitted at trial

that he had perjured himself at the preliminary hearing.
384)

a

(Tr.

Although the point on which the perjury occurred seems

slight (payment for testimony), it illustrated the greater harm
caused by the lack of the preliminary hearing transcript.
lack of

the

transcript

inhibited

Bittner by defense attorneys.
sistencies could

the

cross-examination

The
of

The possibility of other incon-

not be explored and placed before the jury.

Bittner was a critical witness in this case and the lack of a
preliminary hearing transcript immunized him from a successful
cross-examination and deprived

appellants of a full and

fair

hearing.
Though it appears that this Court has not yet addressed
this exact issue, its1 rulings are consistent with the better
reasoned view that a defendant's rights are violated when he is
not allowed a complete transcript of the preliminary hearing.
In State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 782 (Utah 1980), this Court
said:
[T]he preliminary hearing represents a critical stage in the criminal process and a
part of the criminal prosecution.

In Utahf the preliminary hearing is more than a probable cause
hearing.

Two other purposes for the preliminary hearing men-

tioned specifically in Anderson are:

1) the preliminary hearing

is a discovery device and 2) it preserves evidence for trial.
(Id. at 784.)

An incomplete transcript of the preliminary hear-

ing denies the defendant an opportunity to take advantage of
these ancillary purposes of the preliminary hearing.
of the

important

role

the

preliminary

criminal process, the appellants1

hearing

plays

Because
in the

rights were violated by not

allowing them a full transcript and record of the preliminary
hearing.

For the reasons stated above, this court should re-

verse and remand this case for a new preliminary hearing.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF CRIMINAL TRESPASS.
Defense counsel
given to

the

offense of

jury

on

burglary.

requested

criminal
The

court

that

trespass,
refused

appellants were convicted of burglary.

an
a

instruction
lesser

this

be

included

request, and

(Tr. 553)

The statutory test to determine whether one offense
is the lesser

included

offense of another

is articulated

Utah Code Annotated, §76-1-402 (1953 as amended);
(3) ...An offense is... included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same
or less than all the facts required to
establish the commission of the offense
charged.

in

Numerous cases have dealt with a defendant's right to
instructions on a lesser included

offense.

In a recent Utah

Supreme Court case, State v. Baker, 671 P.2d
appellant was
error in the

convicted

offenses.

burglary.

court's refusal

criminal trespass.
discussed the

of

This

importance

appealed,

to instruct

Court
of

He

reversed

152 (Utah 1983),

on the
the

instructions

on

claiming

offense of

conviction
lesser

and

included

The court emphasized the benefit to the defendant in

allowing the jury a less drastic alternative to convicting on
the charged offense.

671 P.2d

at 156 citing Beck v. Alabama,

447 U.S. 625, 633, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 2388 (1980).

The court also

recognized the danger that jurors are more likely to convict if
no lesser instruction is given because of the belief that the
defendant is guilty of some crime.

Jki. at 156-57 citing Keeble

v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 212-13, 93 S.Ct. 1993, 1997-98
(1973) .
In Baker the

court resolved much

of the

confusion

which had previously existed regarding lesser included offenses,
that is, whether a court should apply the "necessarily included
offense" doctrine or an evidence-based analysis in determining
when an instruction on a lesser included offense is warranted.
The court

then held

that the

"necessarily

included

offense"

doctrine, the stricter of the two standards, applies only when
it is the prosecutor seeking the instruction on a lesser included
offense.

But when it is the defendant who requests the instruc-

tion, an evidence-based analysis is employed.
In State v. Brown, 694

P.2d

587

(Utah

1984),

this

court, relying
analysis.

on State v. Baker, utilized the evidence-based

In that case appellant had requested an instruction

on the lesser included
denied, and he was

offense of assault.

convicted

This request was

of aggravated

kidnapping.

The

court held this to be error and analyzed the defense request
based on the two-part test developed in Baker.

The first prong

of the

overlap

test, the

court

noted,

requires

statutory elements of the two offenses.
the evidence-based

standard

requires

an

of

the

The second prong of

the production

of

some

evidence at trial that if believed by the jury, would allow for
acquittal on the offense charged and conviction on the lesser
offense.

Idk at 589.
Using the Baker and Brown analysis, the first prong

requires a comparison of the statutory elements of the offense
of which appellants were convicted, burglary, and the elements
of the

reguested

lesser

offense

of

criminal

trespass.

pertinent statutory elements of criminal trespass are:
U.C.A., 1953, §76-6-206(1).
Criminal Trespass - (1) For purposes of
this section "enter" means intrusion of the
entire body.
(2) A person is guilty of criminal trespass
if, under circumstances not amounting to
burglary as defined in sections 76-6-202,
76-6-203, or 76-6-204:
(a) He enters or remains unlawfully on
property and:
(i) Intends to cause annoyance or
injury to any person thereon or damage to
any property thereon; or
(ii) Intends to commit any crime,
other than theft or a felony;
(iii) Is reckless as to whether
his presence will cause fear for the safety
of another.

The

The burglary

statute proscribes

the

unlawful

entry

into a building with the intent to commit a felony or theft.
(Utah Code Annotated, §76-6-202(1)) Criminal trespass proscribes
an unlawful entry onto property with intent to cause annoyance
or injury to that property.

If the actor commits an unlawful

entrance on property he or she can be guilty of either burglary
or criminal trespass.

Therefore, the statutes overlap and the

determining factor becomes one of intent.

The statutory overlap

in the context of this case is direct.
With regard to the second prong of the analysis, this
Court, in State v. Chestnut, 621 P.2d

1228 (Utah 1980), enun-

ciated the test as follows:
This Court mandates giving defendant's
requested instructions on the lesser offense
if "any evidence, however slight, on any
reasonable theory of the case" might lead
to conviction on the lesser included offense.
Id. at 1232.
In the instant case, the jurors, in reaching a verdict,
were required
given them.

to apply
Included

the

facts

to the legal

instructions

in these instructions were the follow-

ing:
A person commits burglary if he/she enters
or remains unlawfully in a building with
intent to commit a felony or theft.
A person enters or remains unlawfully in or
upon premises when the premises or any
portion thereof at the time of the entry or
remaining are not open to the public and
when the actor is not otherwise licensed or
privileged to enter or remain upon the
premises or such portion thereof. (R. 165)
In applying

the

legal

definition

of

an

"unlawful

entry" to the evidence, the jury may well have concluded that
appellants were guilty of a criminal

trespass rather

burglary.

they

Appellants

testified

that

had

no

than a

intention

of taking anything when they entered the building at Spectra
Symbol.

(R. 796)

They both stated that David Bittner had told

them he had authority to enter the building, (R. 726, 736, 776)
because he was a foreman at Sectra Symbol.

(R. 780, 779, 726)

Appellants also testified that Bittner provided the front door
key so they could enter.
that their purpose
marijuana hidden

(R. 729, 780) Finally, they stated

for entering the building was to retrieve

in his locker.

(R. 731, 775)

This was to

prevent Bittner1s parole officer from finding it on a search of
the locker the next day.

(R. 744)

Clearly, the jury had

a factual basis on which to

conclude that the entry constituted criminal trespass and not a
burglary.

Because the lesser included charge instruction was

not given, the jury was forced to decide between the two extremes
of burglary or acguittal with no "middle ground" upon which to
compromise.

The reasonable choice the jury should have been

given would be between, burglary, criminal trespass, or acguittal.

Because the trial court refused to instruct the jury on

this lessor included charge, this case should be reversed and
remanded to the district court.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY
NOT GIVING THE JURY AN INSTRUCTION REGARDING
ACCOMPLICE TESTIMONY.

Appellants' reauest
the jury was denied.

for a cautionary instruction to

(R. 185)

This proposed

instruction was

directed to the testimony of the accomplice, David Bittner.

It

read as follows?
An accomplice is one who unites with another
person in the commission of a crime,
voluntarily and with common intent. An
accomplice does not become incompetent as a
witness because of participation in the
crime charged. On the contrary, the
testimony of one who asserts by his testimony
that he is an accomplice, may be received
in evidence and considered by the jury,
even though not corroborated by other
evidence, and given such weight as the jury
feels it should have. The jury, however,
should keep in mind that such testimony is
always to be received with caution and
considered with great care.
You should never convict a defendant upon
the unsupported testimony of an alleged
accomplice, unless you believe that
unsupported testimony beyond a reasonable
doubt. (R. 185)
The right to a cautionary instruction is covered by
Utah Code Annotated, §77-17-7(2) which provides:
In the discretion of the court, an instruction to the jury may be given to the effect
that such uncorroborated testimony should
be viewed with caution, and such an instruction shall be given if the trial judge
finds the testimony of the accomplice to be
self contradictory, uncertain or improbable. [Emphasis added].
Under this

statute, the

trial

judge

is

given

the

discretion to determine whether to give a cautionary instruction
or not.

The premise on which the judge makes his or her decision

is whether

the accomplice's

uncertain or improbable.

testimony

is self

contradictory,

Because the accomplice in the instant

case testified

at trial

preliminary hearing, his

that he had perjured himself at the
testimony

admission, self contradictory.
marks, along

with

testimony

was

clearly, by

(Tr. 384)
that

his

own

These perjured re-

directly

conflicted

with

appellants1 testimony made David Bittnerfs testimony uncertain
and improbable.

(Tr. 323-386, R.707-736, 766-797)

Because of

the reasons stated, the jury should have been cautioned regarding Bittner's testimony, as required

by statute.

This court

can only overcome the mistake made by the trial court in one
way - reverse and remand this case for a new trial with such a
proper cautionary instruction.
Courts usually
statute that evidence

follow the

rule

from a witness

stated

whose

in the Utah

self-interest or

attitude may prompt testimony unfavorable to the accused should
be considered with caution and great care.

In Williamson v.

U.S. , 477 F.2d 1309, 1 (5th Cir. 1964), the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals followed the rule that failure to admonish the jury
to narrowly scrutinize the testimony of an accomplice is plain
error.

The Fifth Circuit followed this same reasoning in the

more recent case of Tillery v. U.S. , 411 F.2d

644

(5th Cir.

1969) .
The defendant and accomplice in Tillery were involved
in a burglary.
inconsistently.

The accomplice as in the instant case, testified
The Fifth Circuit stated:

By failing to warn the jury about [accomplice's] reliability in this case, the
trial court presented the evidence to the
jury in an improper perspective and the
jury may have felt bound to accept it as
true. Id. at 648.

The court

reversed

and

remanded

the

appellant's

conviction

because the jury was not given the cautionary instruction.
Courts in the surrounding jurisdictions have followed
the same

reasoning

that

a

jury

instruction

should

be

given

concerning the unreliability of an accomplice's testimony.
State v. Forsyth, 642 P.2d

See

1035, 1040 (Mont. 1982) ("[I]t is

reguired that the jury be instructed by the court on all proper
occasions that the testimony of an accomplice ought to be viewed
with distrust.");

State v. Pantee, 32 Or.App.

117, 573

P.2d

751, 755 (1978), (The proper instruction to a jury was to view
the testimony of an accomplice with distrust); State v. Carothers,
84 Wash.2d 256, 525 P.2d 731, (1974) ("Far from being superfluous
or objectionable, a cautionary instruction is mandatory if the
prosecution relies upon the testimony of an accomplice.")
Appellants contend that under the facts of this case
the trial judge was reguired to give a cautionary instruction
on accomplice's testimony.

Reversal is the only way the appel-

lants can overcome the trial judge's abuse of his discretion in
not allowing

this

instruction.

This

abuse

of discretion

is

reversable error and should be held so by this Court.

CONCLUSION
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, the appellants, George Ray Neeley and Lynn L. Belt, seek

reversal of

their convictions and remand of the cases to the district court

with an order for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted

this j L \

day

of

January,

1986.

RONALD' J. YENGICH
Attorney for Appell

n

1/yfLVm
YNN BROWN

Attorney for Defendant Belt
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ADDENDUM
A
Section 13. [Disqualification of judges].
Except by consent of all the parties, no judge of the
Supreme or inferior courts shall preside in the trial of any
cause where either of the parties shall be connected with him
by affinity or consauguinity within the degree of first counsin,
or in which he "may have been of counsel, or in the trial of
which he may have presided in any inferior court.
B
77-35-29. Rule 29 - Diability and disqualification
of a judge or change of venue.
(a) If, by reason of death, sickness or other disability,
the judge before whom a trial has begun is unable to continue
with the trial, any other judge of that court or any judge
beinq so assigned by the chief judge of the judicial council,
upon certifying that he has familiarized himself with the record
of the trial, may, unless otherwise disqualified, proceed with
and finish the trial; but if the judge so assigned is satisfied
that neither he nor another substitute judge can proceed with
such trial, he may, in his discretion, grant a new trial.
(b) If, by reason of death, sickness or other disability,
the judge before whom a defendant has been tried is unable to
perform the duties required of the court after a verdict of
guilty, any other judge of that court or any judge being so
assigned by the chief judge may perform those duties.
(c) If the prosecution or a defendant in a criminal action
or proceeding shall file an affidavit that the judge before
whom such action or proceeding is to be tried or heard has a
bias or prejudice, either against such party or his attorney or
in favor of any opposing party to the suit, such judge shall
proceed no further therein until the challenge is disposed of.
Every such affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for
the belief that such bias or prejudice exists and shall be
filed as soon as practicable after the case has been assigned
or such bias or prejudice is known. No such affidavit shall be
filed unless accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record
that such affidavit and application are made in good faith.
(d) If the challenged judge questions the sufficiency of
the allegation of disqualification, he shall enter an order
directing that a copy thereof be forthwith certified to another
named judge of the same court or of a court of like jurisdiction,
which judge shall then pass upon the legal sufficiency of the

ADDENDUM CONTINUED
B - §77-35-29.

Rule 29 continued

(d continued)
allegations. If the challenged judge does not guestion the
legal sufficiency of the affidavit, or if the judge to whom the
affidavit is certified finds that it is leqally sufficient,
another judge shall be called to try the case or to conduct the
proceeding. If the judge to whom the affidavit is certified
does not find the affidavit to be legally sufficient, he shall
enter a finding to that effect and the challenged judge shall
proceed with the case or proceeding.
(e) If the prosecution or a defendant in a criminal action
believes that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the
jurisdiction where the action is pending, either may, by motion,
supported by an affidavit setting forth facts, ask to have the
trial of the case transferred to another jurisdiction.
If the court is satisfied that the representations made in
the affidavit are true and justify transfer of the case, the
court shall enter an order for the removal of the case to the
court of another jurisdiction free from such objection and all
records pertaining to the case shall be transferred forthwith
to the court in such other county.
If, based thereon, the
court is not satisfied that the representations so made justify
transfer of the case, the court shall either enter an order
denying said transfer or order a formal hearing in court to
resolve the matter and receive further evidence with respect to
such alleged prejudice.
(f) Whenever a change of judge or place of trial is ordered
all documents of record concerning the case shall be transferred
without delay to the judge who shall hear the case.

ADDENDUM C

LYNN R. BROWN (#4060)
Attorney for Defendant
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
333 South Second East
Salt Lake C i t y , Utah 8 4 1 1 1
Telephone:
532-5444

APR 2 19^5
H

c^xonHir»>i:v d ^ i ' *n -;.<«»'

IN T H E DISTRICT COURT O F T H E THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN A N D F O R SALT LAKE C O U N T Y , STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF U T A H ,

S T I P U L A T I O N

Plaintiff
-vLYNN L. BELT and GEORGE
RAY N E E L Y ,

Case N o . CR-83-823
Judge Jay E . Banks

Defendants
It is hereby stipulated that t h e following

information

may be adopted by t h e Court as factually c o r r e c t :
That September 8, 1964 in Case N o . 1 8 9 3 5 , in State of
Utah v. Lynn Belt and Gaylen J o n a s , J a y Elmer Banks personally
appeared as the attorney for the State of U t a h , at which time
LYNN L. BELT entered a plea of guilty to second degree b u r g l a r y .
LYNN L. BELT v/as sentenced o n September 2 1 , 1964 to the Utah State
Prison.

This judgment and conviction w a s later set aside and

reversed o n a W r i t o f Habeas Corpus filed in t h e United States
District C o u r t .

Belt v. T u r n e r , Case N o . 1 4 0 - 7 1 .

DATED this

", I

d a y of M a r c h , 1985

l
•<

I: i

I
/ i

ih.

RICHARD SHEPHERD
/
Deputy County Attorney

:

I

DATED this 2.0

day of March, 1985.

24u

RON YENGICH
Attorney for Defe.
DATED this s,~

day of March, 1985.
_ -?

)

'LYNN R. BRCHJN
Attorney for Defendant Belt
DELIVERED/IiAILED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt
Lake County Attorney's office, 231 East Fourth South, Salt Lake
City, Utah, this Jj__

day of March, 1985.
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2 • TO
LYNN R. BROWN (#0460)
Attorney for Defendant
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5 444

'**• ,
I

fan <-s_

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

A F F I D A V I T

Plaintiff

-v-

:

LYNN L. BELT,

:

Defendant

Case No .-€£8-3-823
Judge Jay E. Banks

:

I, LYNN L. BELT, being first duly sworn according
to lav; on my oath do depose and say:
1.

That I am the defendant, LYNN L. BELT, in the

case of State of Utah v. George Ray Neely and Lynn L. Belt,
Case No. CR83-823, which is set for trial on January 8, 1985
before the Honorable Jay E. Banks.
2.

That between the years of 1964 and 1972 the

following felony cases against the affiant were prosecuted
through the Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office, during
the time the Honorable Judge Jay E. Banks was the elected
District Attorney and was also personally involved in some of

these cases at various stages of the proceedings:
State of Utah v. Lynn Belt and Gaylen Jonas,
Case No, 13935; Burglary and Theft; Arraignment
July 21 f 1964; Information was signed by Jay
E. Banks.
State of Utah v. Lynn Belt, Case No. 19931;
Burglary and Theft; Trial November 28, 1966
to November 30, 1966; Information signed by
Jay E. Banks.
State of Utah v. Lynn Belt, Case No. 22074;
Burglary and Theft; Arraignment February 2, 1970;
Information signed by Jay E. Banks.
State of Utah v. Lynn Belt, Case No. 22535
Burglary and Theft, Arraignment June 15, 1970;
Information signed by Jay E. Banks.
3.

That because of the above prosecutions against

the affiant through the District Attorney!s Office it is
my belief that the Honorable Jay E. Banks is legally biased
or prejudiced against me and should not conduct the trial
set for January 8, 1935 and should appoint another Judge
as provided in 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this /^~^

day of December, 19 84.

LYNN <£. BELT

,

rr/l)
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this J ^

of

tiMUllm

day

) . 1984
NOTARY PUBLIC
/y
Residing in Salt(j£ake County

My Commission Expires:
—

—

—

,
</'

,v
xJ

<L/ U*<"*

.
hL

^ ^ ^f*/* A**>«-«-<
C

i-nxn r-1 r* *" '
Salt U>'
LYNN R. BR0T.7N

^ l ' '*

(#0460)

Attorney for Defendant
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff

:
:

-v-

:

LYNN L. BELT,

:

Defendant

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE

Case No. CR-83-823

:

FACTS
LYNN L. BELT is the defendant in the case of State of
Utah v, George Ray Neely and Lynn L. Belt, Case No. CR-83-823,
v/hich is set for trial April 2, 1985 before the Honorable Jay
E. Banks.

Between 1964 and 1972, the Salt Lake County District

Attorney's Office prosecuted the following four felony cases
against Mr. Belt:
State of Utah v. Lynn Belt and Gaylen Jonas,
Case No. 18935; Burglary and Theft; Arraianment
July 21, 1964; Information was signed by Jay E.
Banks.
State of Utah v. Lynn Belt, Case No. 19931;
Burglary and Theft; Trial November 28, 1966
to November 30, 1966; Information signed by
Jay E. Banks.
State of Utah v. Lynn Belt, Case No. 22074;
Burglary and Theft; Arraignment February 2, 1970;
Information signed by Jay E. Banks.

State of Utah v. Lynn Belt, Case No. 22535;
Burglary and Theft; Arraignment June 15, 1970;
Information signed by Jay E. Banks.
During that time the Honorable Judge Jay E. Banks was elected
District Attorney and was personally involved in some of these
cases.
In Case No. 18935, State of Utah v. Lynn Belt and
Gaylen Jonas, Jay Elmer Banks personally appeared September 8,
1964 representing the State.

Mr. Belt entered a plea of guilty

to second degree burglary in the case and was sentenced
September 21, 1964 to the Utah State Prison.

This judgment

and conviction was later set aside and reversed on a Writ of
Habeas Corpus filed in the United State District Court.

Belt

v. Turner, Case No. 140-71.
ISSUE
THE JUDGE WHO WAS COUNSEL FOR THE STATE IN ANOTHER
CASE AGAINST MOVANT IS DISQUALIFIED FROM PRESIDING
AT THE TRIAL AS A MATTER OF LAW.
Article VIII, Section 13 of the Utah Constitution
specifically provides for disqualification of the presiding
judge where the judge "may have been of counsel" at an earlier
date.

(Appendix A ) .
The same protection against biased judges is also

recognized in Utah's Code of Criminal Procedure.
§77-35-29(c), Rule 29 (1982 as amended).

Utah Code Ann.

(Appendix A ) .

The bias

may be either against a party or in favor of the opposing party according
to the statute.

The Rule mandates the judge proceed no further once an
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affidavit alledging bias or prejudice is filed.

Another judge must

either try the case or conduct the hearing.
Mr. Belt has only found one Utah case where the sitting
trial judge had previously been a deputy in the County Attorney's
Office which was investigating the beliefs and practices of
polygamous marriage, the same matter which the petitioner was
being tried for.

The petitioner's affidavit alleged his prosecution

for conspiracy to advise and practice polygamous marriages resulted
directly from the investigations conducted by the County Attorneyfs
Office.

Musser v. Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County,

106 Ut. 373, 148 P.2d 802 (1944).

The Court reasoned because the

alleged prejudice was founded on the religious beliefs of the
judge, a reason not specifically set forth in the statute for
disqualification, the matter was left entirely within the discretion
of the trial court.

For this reason, even through the same judge

had previously ruled against the petitioners for unlawful cohabitation,
the judgefs decision not to disqualify himself was not disturbed on
appeal.

The statute now requires the judge receiving the affidavit

to have that matter heard by another judge.

Utah Code Ann. §77-35-29

(1982 as amended), Anderson v. Anderson, 13 Utah 2d 36, 368 P.2d 264
(1962) .
Even though the Musser decision is now outdated, some
of its language reflects the newer more liberal policy contemplated
by Utah Constitution, Article VIII, Section 13 and Utah Code Ann.
§77-35-29 (1982 as amended).

The Court admitted it might have been

"better that a fresh mind sit on the latter case.11 148 P. 2d at 803.
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A few years later the Utah Supreme Court again considered
the question of bias or prejudice as the part of the judge.

In

Haslam v. Morrison, 113 Utah 14, 190 P.2d 520 (1948) the Court
found actual bias or prejudice in the part of the judge disqualifies
him.

Although the affidavit in Haslam v. Morrison was found to

be insufficient to support the allegation, the Court took a very
strong position commending disqualification whenever an affidavit
alleges bias.

The Court further found disqualification was the

general practice in Utah whenever an affidavit of bias has been
filed.

190 P. 2d at 523.

The Court stated "[t]he purity and

integrity of the judicial process ought to be protected against
any taint of suspicion to the end that the public and litigants
may have the highest confidence in the integrity and fairness
of the courts." Id.
Justice Wade's concurring opinion noted the danger of
a biased judge being tempted to hold falsely he is not biased.
Justice Wade further commented that even if the judge is not
biased but where a party believes he is, there is no reason another
judge should not be called in to try the case since the result
should be the same, 190 P.2d at 526.

The importance of a fair

and impartial trial and the importance of the public's "absolute
confidence in the integrity of the courts" clearly support the
"almost universal practice...to get another judge even on the
mere suggestion of a party...that the judge was biased or prejudiced."
Id.
Under the terms of the Utah Constitution and the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the judge in the present case should

be disqualified.

Here, there is r\ore than the mere possibility

of personal bias where the judge, in his previous capacity as
a prosecuting attorney conducted a criminal case against Mr.
Belt as in the case of United States v. Zerilli, 328 F. Supp. 706
(CD. Cal. 1971) . The Judge should be required to disqualify
himself as in Zerilli, though in Zerilli the judge had prosecuted
one of the defendants thirty years earlier.

Mr. Belt's right

to a fair and impartial trial mandate nothing less than disqualification of Judge Jay E. Banks in the case at bar.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this jf

day of April, 1985.

LYNN R. BROWN
Attorney for Defendant
DELIVERED/MAILED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt
Lake County Attorney's Office, 231 East Fourth South, Salt Lake
City, Utah, this

<(

day of April, 1985.

ADDENDUM D

LYNN R. BROWN (#0460)
Attorney for Defendant
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444

APR 2 ft*,

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

A M E N D E D
A F F I D A V I T

Plaintiff
-vCase No. CR-83-823
Judge Jay E. Banks

LYNN L. BELTf
Defendant

STATE OF UTAH

)

County of Salt Lake

: ss
)

I, LYNN L. BELT, being first duly sworn according to
law on my oath do depose and say:
1.

That I am the defendant, LYNN L. BELT, in the

case of State of Utah v. George Ray Neely and Lynn L. Belt,
Case No. CR-83-823, which is set for trial on April 2, 1985
before the Honorable Jay E. Banks.
2.

That between the years of 1964 and 1972 the

following felony cases against the affiant were prosecuted
through the Salt Lake County District Attorney's office.
During that time the Honorable Judge Jay E. Banks was elected
District Attorney.

He was also personally involved in some of

these cases at various stages of the proceedings:

State of Utah v. Lynn Belt and Gaylen Jonas,
Case No. 18935; Burglary and Theft; Arraignment
July 21, 1964; Information was signed by Jay E.
Banks .
State of Utah v. Lynn Belt, Case No. 19931;
Burglary and Theft; Trial November 28, 1966
to November 30, 1966; Information signed by
Jay E. Banks.
State of Utah v. Lynn Belt, Case No. 22074;
Burglary and Theft; Arraignment February 2, 1970;
Information signed by Jay E. Banks.
State of Utah v. Lynn Belt, Case No. 22535;
Burglary and Theft; Arraignment June 15, 1970;
Information signed by Jay E. Banks.
3.

That September 8, 1964 in Case No. 18935, in

State of Utah v. Lynn Belt and Gaylen Jonas, Jay Elmer Banks
personally appeared as the attorney for the State of Utah, at
which time LYNN L. BELT entered a plea of guilty to second
degree burglary.

LYNN L. BELT was sentenced on September 21, 1964

to the Utah State Prison.

This judgment and conviction was later

set aside and reversed on a Writ of Habeas Corpus filed in the
United States District Court.

Belt v. Turner, Case No. 140-71.

This information has been verified via telephone conversation with
Ms. Andrea Joo at United States Clerk's office in Denver, Colorado
and the records at the Salt Lake County Attorney's office.
4.

That because of the above prosecutions against

the affiant through the District Attorney's office, it is
my belief that the Honorable Jay E. Banks is legally biased
or prejudiced against me and should not conduct the trial set
for April 2, 1985, and should appoint another Judge as provided
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in 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
DATED this %'f

day of March, 1985.

(A

..iVHr*^

rf fisAi-/-

LYN8J L. BELT

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this Q')

day of

March, 1985.

My Commission Expires:

-x^-%%

l
{
\ni\U(i'lh\i
^i'lYA
NOTARY PUBLIC
/]

Residing ln:

y

'

/
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ADDENDUM E

County of Salt Lake - State of Utah
F

TITLE:

(*> PARTIES PRESENT)

COUNSEL:

llpNn

CR

83-823

(• COUNSEL PRESENT)

e+

STATE OF UTAH

:

RICHARD SHEPHERD

X

VS
LYNN L .

BELT

N/P

LYNN BROWN
.

X

RONALD YENGICH

X

KATHY GROTEPAS
CLERK

HON.

J U L I E CLEGG

PHILIP FISHLER
JLU

REPORTER

DATE:

APRIL 1, 1985

GENE UNSWORTH
BAILIFF

Defendant's motion to disqualify Judge Banks from this case
comes now before the Court for hearing.

Appearances as shown above.

Based upon arguments, the Court takes the matter under advisement,
and will advise counsel later on this same day as to the Court's rulinc

The Court now being informed, denies defendant's motion to disqualify Judge Banks for the following reasons:
1.

The motion was not filed timely.

2.

The motion was ruled upon by Judge Conder who was then

the presiding Judge.

The motion was denied by Judge Conder.

The

facts before Judge Conder were substantially the same facts brought
to this Court's attention except that it is now asserted that one of
defendant Belt's earlier convictions was overturned.

In considering

this portion of the affidavit, this Court finds that it is legally
insufficient in light of Judge Conder's earlier ruling.

Counsel called April 1, 1985 by Kathy Grotepas and Pat Jones
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